Applying new thinking from the linked and emerging fields of digital identity and privacy to information governance in health informatics by Harrison, John & Booth, Nick
Informatics in Primary Care (2003) 11: 223–8 © 2003 PHCSG, British Computer Society
Introduction
The arrival of near-ubiquitous electronic networks
has finally made it practical to realise the goal of true
person-centric information technology (IT) systems.
The holy grail of health informatics, a true lifelong
electronic health record, is becoming a reality. Recog-
nising this, the National Health Service (NHS) has –
as part of the ongoing National Programme for IT –
drawn up plans for a national repository of personal
health data, to be called the national patient data spine.
The first (unpublished) specification for the core
spine suggests that the design, in the early years at
least, will be rudimentary. Patients will be invited to
give a one-off consent for use of the spine to store
their health data. If consent is given, potentially any
NHS professional will be able to gain access to the
patient’s data, with professional ethics and the threat
of retribution through employment law as the only
deterrents to unauthorised browsing. Should the
patient refuse consent, data will still be transmitted
from local systems to the spine, but will normally only
be used in an anonymous form for research purposes.
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ABSTRACT
Recent work in the emerging field of network or
digital identity suggests a new approach to the design
of informatics systems, in which the individual
becomes the guardian of their own personal data,
and is assisted in controlling access to it by an
infrastructure that is aware of roles, such as ‘doctor’,
and relationships, such as ‘doctor–patient’. For these
purposes, an ‘identity’ is defined as the history of a
relationship between two entities, and thus
encompasses not only name and address but also
data that would usually be regarded as part of
an electronic patient or health record. This paper
presents a description of how such a true person-
centric architecture might work, and shows how it
can be seen as an evolution of current plans in the
NHS for a national patient data spine. One applica-
tion, the electronic transmission of prescriptions, is
described in detail. Other applications, both within
and without the healthcare field, are described in
outline. The implementation of such a person-
centric system requires a modest degree of technical
innovation, but significant change in organisational
and business models. It is suggested that there is a
need for one or more not-for-profit trusts, each
with a remit to act as host for an individual’s digital
identity, and as the individual’s true agent. Service
providers – such as healthcare organisations – will
pay the trust for provision of authentication, and
for the storage and transmission of a patient’s data;
the trust in turn will pay implementation partners,
such as smart card issuers and providers of com-
munication channels, acting on behalf of the
individual.
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In the longer term, the NHS envisages that access to
a patient’s records will be limited to those profes-
sionals who have a ‘legitimate relationship’ with the
patient. Leaving aside the difficulties of defining who
has, and does not have, such a relationship, the phrase
does at least point to one possible evolution path for
health informatics systems: that arising from new
thinking in the emerging and linked fields of digital
identity and privacy. Identity, as we argue below, is all
about relationships.
What is identity? 
The very word ‘identity’ is unsatisfactory in at least
two respects. First, it implies that an individual has a
single identity that is used for many different purposes.
Although for most people this is close to the truth,
one odd effect of the various data protection laws is
that, because it is generally illegal for third parties to
exchange personal information without consent, an
individual could in theory use a different identity for
each third party with whom he interacts. As a case in
point, note how an individual can be known as ‘J
Smith’ to one internet service provider, as ‘Jonathan
Smith’ to a second, and as ‘John Smith’ to a third:
because the service providers do not – or should not –
communicate, there is no reason for the individual to
settle upon a single version of his name for all uses.
Thus, for the purposes of analysis and system design,
it is useful to think about an individual’s many
‘identities’, as shown in Figure 1.
Looked at this way, an individual has one or more
health identities by which they are known to their
various healthcare providers, a fiscal identity for
payment of taxation, a legal identity for passport
purposes, a private identity by which they are known
to a friend, and so on.
The second problem with the word ‘identity’ is that
it suggests a defined set of facts about, or attributes of,
the individual. In reality, there is no clear definition,
and the attributes that go to make up a given identity
depend on the purposes for which that identity is to
be used. Thus, for voting purposes, the only relevant
attributes may be place of residence and age, both 
of which must be authenticated to some degree: an
individual’s legal name is not required, and someone
could present himself as Mickey Mouse and still 
be allowed to vote. For the purposes of an internet
chat room, the only necessary attribute is a persistent
pseudonym that facilitates recognition from one com-
munication to the next. For building access, the only
relevant attribute is whether or not the individual has
been given permission to access by the building man-
ager. And for payment systems, the only necessary
attributes are a valid account number and knowledge
of a personal identification number (PIN). Very few
applications require what might be called ‘legal identity’,
that is the set of attributes by which an individual is
known to the government of a country.
In some circumstances, it is useful to expand the
definition of identity to include aspects of the history
of the relationship between an individual and a third
party. Thus doctors may discuss in the abstract the
case of ‘the child diagnosed with Y disease’, using the
attribute of the child which for them distinguishes
him from any other, and is more memorable than his
name. Take this to the extreme, and one can say that
identity in its fullest sense is the history of relation-
ships: thus an individual’s medical identities are his
various patient records; an individual’s identity at a
supermarket is his loyalty account; and a person’s
identity with a particular bank includes the frequency
with which he goes overdrawn.
Privacy and linkage of identities
One can just about imagine a perfectly private world,
in which third parties never exchange information
about an individual and every identity relationship 
is self-contained. But in the real world, with all the
pressure to get things done, identities are linked
together constantly, sometimes for good reason and
sometimes for bad.
Looking at bad practice first, commercial organ-
isations sometimes exchange personal information,
and so link identities, without the consent of the
individual, and in the near certain knowledge that the
individual would not have given consent had he been
asked. Such practices are mostly illegal under theFigure 1 Many identities
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various data protection acts. Examples include the
selling of email and street addresses, with spam and
junk mail as the unwelcome results.
In contrast, one way of thinking of good practice in
data management is as a form of negotiation. Suppose
an individual requests an organisation to effect a trans-
action for his benefit. In response, the organisation
informs the individual that certain personal informa-
tion is required. The individual must then decide
whether to comply with the requirement and proceed,
or decline and forgo any benefit from the transaction.
Examples in the United Kingdom (UK) include the
opening of a bank account, where the banks are
required by anti-money-laundering legislation to
inspect evidence of legal identity; the need to show 
a birth certificate to obtain a driving licence or pass-
port; and the need – in some difficult cases – to
obtain an individual’s consent before information
can be shared between health and social care
professionals.
But good practice in data management does not
always require explicit consent. One example concerns
what might be called ‘negative information’, such as a
criminal record, where an individual does not benefit
from its transmission and so will not give consent.
Instead, society has decided that – for the greater 
good – certain public sector agencies should have
access to such negative information, and has legislated
accordingly.
Finally, there are many situations where positive
information is shared quite legally between different
third parties, but where the individual does not give
specific permission in a clumsy mechanistic fashion.
Instead, access is dictated largely by the role of the third
party with respect to the individual: thus a parent
automatically has the right to see the school report of
a child; a doctor often discusses a patient’s medical
history with a colleague, but would never do so with a
lay-person; and an individual might look in a friend’s
calendar to find out their whereabouts. All of these
access rights are conveyed by a combination of role
and relationship, and not by explicit consent. Role can
be regarded as the pre-qualification for, and relation-
ship as the determinant of, access: an individual might
well say that they not only want access to their records
to be limited to those with a medical qualification, but
– more specifically – to be limited to those who also
have a relationship with them, such as doctor–patient,
nurse–patient, and so on.
What we lack at present is an IT infrastructure
capable of using role and relationship to determine
rights of access to personal information, both in the
health sector and more generally. In the remainder of
this paper, we will outline one possible model – called
Virtual Home® (VH) – for such an infrastructure, and
then describe early steps towards its realisation.
A new approach to ETP
Suppose, for a moment, that each individual were to
be given a point of presence in the network space that
could be used to store personal information provided
by third parties, either absolutely or in the form of
links to data held elsewhere. If such information were
to include descriptions of their roles with respect to
other individuals and organisations, it could be used
to determine access rights to information held in, or
accessible through, other points of presence.
This notion conjures up a world of possibilities, in
which many such points of presence interact in ways
analogous to human interaction in the real world. But
immediately there is a naming problem: the term
‘point of presence’ is too cold and impersonal, and
since role information can be lifelong, we need a term
that conveys permanence as well as trust and security.
For now, let us call one of these points of presence a
Virtual Home.
To give just one example of its use, think about how
someone might obtain, say, repeat medication by post.
In many countries this is not currently possible: instead
the individual, or their representative, must collect a
signed paper prescription from a family doctor, take
the prescription to a pharmacist, and then either pay
the required fee or sign to claim exemption on any 
of several grounds. VH allows this transaction to be
carried out remotely, and would seem to offer clear
benefits over competing designs for the electronic
transmission of prescriptions (ETP). The individual
gives to their doctor an electronic key permitting
write-access to a prescription proforma within their
VH. They then give a second key, this time permitting
read-access, to the pharmacist who dispenses the
required medication for delivery by post, and signs
digitally to indicate what has been done.
By requiring the individual to give permission to
both doctor and pharmacist in this way, the system
observes good privacy practice for the transmission of
information. But this is not enough. There is also a
need to convince the pharmacist that the prescription
is genuine, and it is here that roles begin to be im-
portant. Just as in the real world, where an individual
must go to a doctor to obtain a prescription but can
choose which doctor, so in the network space VH
constrains the individual to give write-access for pre-
scription purposes only to a person permitted to
exercise the role of doctor. Role information for the
pharmacist is also important. Should the individual
wish to collect their medication personally rather than
have it sent by post, they could give the pharmacist a
unique identifier, perhaps carried on a token such as a
smart card, and then authorise access by inputting 
a PIN on a keypad. The VH system will then limit 
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the pharmacist to seeing only information relevant 
to their role, and will not disclose any other informa-
tion that the individual may have chosen to store
within their VH. Note, however, that information
relevant to the pharmacist’s role may not be limited to
that provided by the doctor: the individual could
choose also to give them access to information pro-
vided by other third parties, such as evidence of
entitlement to exemption from payment of prescrip-
tion charges on grounds of age, chronic illness, low
income, prepayment, and so on.
As a slight digression, this prescription application
is useful to show how concepts in virtual identity can
be extended to apply to businesses, particularly small
businesses. If identity is defined as the sum of facts
recorded about an entity by a third party, then every
transaction results in a modification to the identity of
both involved parties. Thus as the pharmacist fulfils 
a prescription for the individual, and signs on the
relevant VH page, they render the individual – or 
the ‘system’ acting on behalf of the individual –
capable of certifying to some third party that a certain
kind of prescription has indeed been dispensed, and 
an appropriate certificate could be stored on the
‘prescriptions dispensed’ page in a virtual pharmacy
(VP). This would be useful in situations where
pharmacists claim reimbursement from a health
insurer for every prescription dispensed: instead of
the present cumbersome process of sending bundles
of paper prescriptions to a processing centre, the
pharmacist would give the reimbursing entity read-
access to their VP ‘prescriptions dispensed’ page,
whereupon the entity would calculate the amount due
by the application of business rules and make payment
by bank transfer to the pharmacist’s account, details
of which could have been picked up from a different
page within the VP.
Other VH applications
Returning now to the main Virtual Home theme, many
other applications can be envisaged. Some, like the
prescription example given above, involve accounts of
different kind: for example, an individual could use
their VH to permit sharing of information between a
car registration authority and a municipality in order
to obtain a parking permit; or to permit sharing of
relevant information between medical and social care
professionals, probably relying upon the professionals
themselves to determine what information is, and 
is not, relevant for any given transaction. In other
applications, the individual could use their VH to
establish links between one-to-one records of like
kind – such as electronic patient records, bank 
accounts, exam results and even retail loyalty accounts
– so as to create the corresponding one-to-many
records, respectively a lifelong electronic health record,
a credit record, a validated résumé and a complete
retail profile. They could then employ the system of
role-based access control to ensure that the infor-
mation is used only for their benefit. Note that the
ability to use VH as a store of a validated résumé fits
nicely with the role-based functionality: a doctor
could store their medical credentials in their VH, and
the system could then use the same credentials in the
control of access to medical records.
The common thread that links all of these
applications together is the system by which the
individual gives consents or permissions. Thus far we
have shown how the individual can use this system to
exercise control over personal data provided by third
parties, but there is every reason to extend its use 
to cover personal data provided by the individual
themselves, such as online calendars, contact books
and wish lists. Going yet further, the individual could
use VH as the basis for a system of intelligent mail re-
direction, in which parcels are labelled with a unique
identifier rather than a street address, and entities
enjoying the role of ‘delivery company’ could use this
identifier to obtain a valid delivery address from the
VH system – which could be ‘the office’ Monday to
Friday and ‘home’ at weekends. And one can imagine
a variant of this approach, in which marketing com-
panies pay for a time-limited unique identifier which
only maps on to a valid delivery address for a period
specified by the individual, thus solving the problems
of junk mail and, by extension, of email spam.
Governance and business
model
It is quite clear that realising the VH concept requires
not only technical innovation, but also significant
organisational and commercial innovation. Consider
first the nature of the entity that will host a VH: it
must be trusted; it must be seen clearly to be on the
side of the individual, that is, to act as the individual’s
agent; and as a trusted agent it must be financially
transparent. These values can only be delivered over
the long term by an organisation that adopts object-
ives consistent with the values. At one extreme, the
organisation could be a national government institu-
tion, but in many societies few would wish govern-
ment to act in this role of trusted agent. At the other
extreme, the host could also be a conventional com-
mercial company, but again it seems unlikely that people
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would wish to entrust a lifelong digital identity to
such an entity, especially if there is just one provider
rather than a fully competitive market. The right answer
is probably a compromise between the two extremes,
either a charity or a commercial company with a
stated aim of breaking even rather than maximising
profit. Initially we might see one of these entities,
perhaps called a Virtual Home Trust, for region A, and
another for region B, and so on.
A VH trust, as shown in Figure 2, would be
governed by a board of trustees, either appointed by
another democratic body, or elected using e-voting
enabled by the VH system itself. To fulfil its remit as
the agent of the individual, the trust would – of neces-
sity – be independent of any token issuer, application
provider or communication channel, and would need
to develop a system of unique identifiers that was used
only to distinguish between different VHs and was
thus one level above the identifiers used by service
providers. To maintain privacy, all mappings between
service-specific numbers and the individual’s unique
VH number would take place within the boundaries
of the VH system, and thus the individual’s unique
VH number would never be disclosed externally.
In order to make the system viable commercially,
the trust would be obliged to act as a clearing house
for payments made by application providers (such as
municipalities and healthcare providers), and for
payments made to implementation partners (such as
smart card issuers, mobile network operators and
others).
Going one step further, there would seem to be
many advantages in requiring the VH trust to keep
accounts on a personal basis for each user of the sys-
tem. Application providers will then pay fees, either
on a transaction or periodic basis, as the individual
makes use of VH to access their service, and the
individual will be able to take their choice, within the
limits imposed by technical compatibility, of token
issuer and communication channel. The transaction
fee approach is not dissimilar to that used by the credit
card networks, and will allow the system to grow beyond
limitations imposed by a cruder payment method that
might seem adequate for any one sector. But there is, of
course, one great difference: whereas VISA is a not-
for-profit entity that works as the agent of retail banks,
a VH trust will be a not-for-profit entity that works 
as the agent of the individual – and may, although 
this might appear contradictory, return a profit to
individuals who choose to allow use of their data for
various marketing purposes.
The idea that VH is completely under the control of
the individual raises the question of how many VHs
any one individual might have. In principle, this is for
the individual to decide, and only they can make the
trade-off between the convenience of using a single
VH for many different applications and the risk asso-
ciated with creating a single point of failure. Note,
however, that this risk is mitigated by the fact that
frequent use both justifies a higher-quality authenti-
cation token and makes it more likely that a user will
react quickly to token loss or other security breach.
Note also that certain applications, such as e-voting,
may require that individuals use a ‘primary VH’, as
indicated by the presence of a particular credential,
perhaps indicating uniqueness or some other attribute.
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Figure 2 VH organisational structure
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Progress to date
As always at the beginning of something new, there is
the question of how to get started. Consumer-facing
commercial companies are unlikely ever to sponsor
the creation of a VH trust because they are jealous 
of customer data and fearful about intermediation.
Departments of national government are little better
because, even though they would benefit greatly were
VH to exist, they tend to be risk-averse and slow to
take up new approaches. In contrast, local and
regional administrations are relatively nimble, and are
given licence by national government to experiment:
there are now signs that something akin to VH may be
launched by a consortia of UK local authorities, using
funding provided by national government under 
the various e-government programmes. Whether the
NHS can be persuaded to participate remains an open
question.
In parallel to this demand-side activity, there are
also signs that the supplier base is developing the
necessary standards for network identity. One such
initiative is the Liberty Alliance,a non-profit grouping
set up in 2001 to create open standards in the field;1
and there are competing initiatives from the likes of
Novell and Microsoft. But identity management is not
primarily a technical problem: substantive progress
requires that consumer-facing organisations recognise
the need for organisational and commercial innovation,
and that takes time.
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